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a b s t r a c t
Many proposals have been made for the more successful inclusion of LULUCF (Land Use,
Land Use Change and Forestry) in the Kyoto framework. Though the positions of individual
states or the goal of avoided deforestation guide many approaches, our model sets cost-
effective strategies for climate change mitigation and the efficient and balanced use of forest
resources at its center. Current approaches to forest resource-based carbon accounting
consider only a fraction of its potential and fail to adequately mobilize the LULUCF sector for
the successful stabilization of atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations. The
presence of a significantly large ‘‘incentive gap’’ justifies the urgency of reforming the current
LULUCF carbon accounting framework. In addition to significantly broadening the scope of
carbon pools accounted under LULUCF, we recommend paying far greater attention to the
troika of competing but potentially compatible interests surrounding the promotion of
standing forests (in particular for the purposes of carbon sequestration, biodiversity pro-
tection and ecosystem promotion/ preservation), harvested wood products (HWP) and
bioenergy use. The successful balancing of competing interests, the enhancement of
efficiency and effectiveness and the balanced use of forest resources require an accounting
mechanism that weighs and rewards each component according to its real climate mitigation
potential. Further, our data suggest the benefits of such a broadly based carbon accounting
strategy and the inclusion of LULUCF in national and international accounting and emission
trading mechanisms far outweigh potential disadvantages. Political arguments suggesting
countries could take advantage of LULUCF accounting to reduce their commitments are not
supported by the evidence we present.
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The principal objective of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is to ‘‘stabilize [GHG]
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system’’. Though precise atmospheric targets are
disputed (IPCC, 2007; Hansen et al., 2008, 2009), widespread
agreement on the need to reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas* Corresponding author at: Institute for World Economics, Hungarian 
E-mail address: EllisonDL@GMail.Com (D. Ellison).
1462-9011  # 2011 Elsevier Ltd. 
doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2011.07.001
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.(GHG) concentrations persists. How this goal should be
achieved, what is the most cost-efficient method and how
existing resources can be most effectively mobilized are
subjects of significant international, EU-level and national
debate. Though current efforts focus primarily on the large
share of emissions stemming from the energy sector (in
particular power plants) and carbon-intensive industries,
some have attempted to focus attention on the potential role
other sectors might play in achieving emission reductions.
Significant attention has been focused, for example, onAcademy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary.
Fig. 1 – Carbon accounting and reporting frameworks.
Source: Based on our understanding of the KP, UNFCCC and EU regulatory mechanisms. *Note: since it is in part voluntary
whether countries include some unmanaged lands under managed lands (e.g. some land use conversions may reported
under FM or A/R, while some wetlands may be reported under Deforestation, IPCC, 2003).
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reductions in the transport sector.
One of the more neglected features of climate policy is Land
Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) and the troika of
resources and interests it represents. Forests and forest soils
represent one of the principal sources of terrestrial carbon
sequestration as well as natural havens for biodiversity
protection and ecosystem promotion/preservation. Harvested
wood products (HWP) have value both as a form of carbon
sequestration and fossil fuel substitution. Biomass for heat
and power generation is one of the principal sources of
renewable energy generation. Standing forests, HWP and
bioenergy thus define a troika crucial to the long-term survival
of any agreement, to the cost-effectiveness of climate
mitigation strategies and to the balanced and efficient use
of forest resources.
Since significant and sometimes powerful interests under-
lie each of the component features of the troika, the successful
revision of the existing accounting framework requires their
judicious balancing. An accounting framework that favors one
or more at others’ expense will weaken the final LULUCF
contribution to the goals of climate change mitigation and
adaptation and destabilize forests and the forestry value
chain. Since bioenergy substitutes for fossil fuels and emis-
sions from bioenergy-based heat and power production are
considered carbon neutral,1 the heavy emphasis on emission1 Depending on the role the United States plays in current nego-
tiations, the recent decision by the US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to count such emissions may cast doubt on the long-
term acceptance of ‘‘carbon neutral status’’ for bioenergy-based
heat and power production in other countries.reductions in other sectors means that bioenergy will be
strongly favored regardless of what happens to standing
forests or HWP.
Carbon accounting practices, though frequently neglected
in the climate change mitigation and adaptation literature,2
ultimately define the nuts and bolts of what counts and which
resources (forest, forest-based or other) are favored and
utilized. To-date, accounting practices under the UNFCCC,
Kyoto Protocol (KP), European Union (EU) and other national
level emission reduction schemes fail to adequately mobilize
the LULUCF sector. Moreover, each of these frameworks
(UNFCCC, KP, EU, etc.) employs different reporting and/or
accounting conventions with significant and potentially
adverse impacts on how forest resources are used (Fig. 1).
Finally, each of these frameworks fails to incorporate
important (though not always the same) carbon pools.
Carbon sequestration in standing forests is not fully
recognized in some accounting frameworks (e.g. the EU does
not allow for the inclusion of LULUCF in EU-based commit-
ments and carbon credits cannot be traded in the EU’s ETS).
The implementation of LULUCF accounting is uneven across
Parties to the KP. Carbon sequestered in HWP is currently not
counted in any of these frameworks and bioenergy is heavily
favored vis-a`-vis the other elements of the troika. The
successful inclusion of all major terrestrial carbon pools in
a revised and updated Kyoto Protocol (KP) accounting
framework in a way that fully accounts for all carbon credits
from both fossil fuel substitution and carbon sequestration2 See however the important contributions from Pingoud et al.
(2003), Schlamadinger et al. (2007a,b), Ho¨hne et al. (2007), Cowie
et al. (2007), Sathre and O’Connor (2008) and Petersson et al. (2009).
4 Several countries have re-negotiated their ‘‘caps’’. In particu-
lar, Russia doubled the size of its cap in 2001 (12/CP.7) and Italy
dramatically raised its cap in 2006 (8/CMP.2) (Ho¨hne et al., 2007:
357). Japan and Canada have also renegotiated their caps (Schla-
madinger et al., 2007b: 297).
5 Canada and some other countries have been driven by con-
cerns over the potential impact of disturbances such as widespread
forest dieback from pests like the mountain pine beetle or severe
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carbon trading schemes would encourage both long term
carbon sequestration (in standing forests and HWP) and
bioenergy resource use.
This paper has two closely intertwined goals. The first is to
propose a simplified, improved and more cost-efficient
strategy for stabilizing atmospheric GHG emissions. The
second is to promote a more balanced and efficient use of
forest-based resources that promotes the twin goals of climate
change mitigation (carbon sequestration and fossil fuel
substitution) and adaptation (biodiversity protection and
ecosystem promotion/preservation). Including and strength-
ening the climate change mitigation and adaptation potential
of forests and forestry in the UNFCCC framework represents
one of the greatest single challenges in the current negotiation
round and its relevance is only heightened by the likelihood
the +2 8C target will be surpassed (see e.g. Weaver et al., 2007).
Without substantial reform, LULUCF accounting cannot
achieve a balanced and efficient use of forest-based resources,
nor will it create the foundations for an optimal strategy of
fossil fuel substitution and carbon sequestration. These twin
goals can however be effectively and easily achieved with a
strategy that includes both forests and forestry more generally
in the climate change mitigation and adaptation framework.
Though we cannot herein address the adaptation side of
this debate,3 we focus in some detail on climate change
mitigation aspects and note in passing that the promotion of
carbon sequestration in standing forests simultaneously
promotes both mitigation and adaptation, in particular by
supporting biodiversity, future forest resilience and ecosys-
tem promotion/preservation. At the same time, we acknowl-
edge in advance the potential need to consider additional
features, in particular where the goal of biodiversity promo-
tion may not fully coincide with those of forestry and the goals
of afforestation, HWP’s and bioenergy use.
2. Shortcomings in the current accounting
system
In order to create incentives for both cost-efficient strategies
for climate change mitigation and for the balanced and
efficient use of forest resources, carbon accounting measures
should cover all major carbon pools and emissions and should
weigh all GHG sources equally based on their global warming
potentials. Climate targets should be achieved in the most
cost-, land-use-efficient and balanced way possible. The
unequal weighting of carbon pools or their complete neglect
in carbon accounting will lead to the unbalanced and
inefficient use of forest-based and other climate change
mitigation resources. The overriding goal should however
be to create incentives for improvements wherever possible.
Under current accounting practices, the LULUCF sector
remains only weakly mobilized. Though the KP currently
allows countries to voluntarily account for a share of the
carbon sequestered in standing forests, important carbon
pools are neglected, ignored or excluded. The omission and3 There has however been ample discussion of the potential
biodiversity benefits. See for example CBD (2009).neglect of significant carbon pools in the carbon accounting
framework creates tremendous disincentives to employ
LULUCF potential in reducing GHG emissions. Restrictions
on and gaps in carbon accounting procedures further
significantly reduce incentives to mobilize the LULUCF sector.
The likely impact on global emission-reducing potential is
profound.
Ideally all lands should be equally accounted for in one
unified and coherent system. Further, the accounting system
should be able to handle conversions from natural net
emissions to anthropogenic—such as the conversion of former
unmanaged to managed land. Likewise, the conversion of other
managed lands (not currently considered forest land) to forest
land (e.g. abandoned cropland to forest land), could and
presumably should be labeled ‘‘afforestation’’. Ceasing cultiva-
tion would thus become equivalent to human-induced change.
Carbon pool omissions are essentially of two types. The
first type includes land-types not counted under the current
system. Unmanaged lands and certain types of land conver-
sions fall under the first category. Some activities are not
counted because they are voluntary, while others are simply
not covered. Carbon pools not accounted for under the current
system include carbon pool changes under wetland restora-
tion and peatlands. Conversions from settlements and
grassland to forest are likewise not handled well.
The second type concerns either restrictions on or gaps in
the accounting system and involves restrictions such as the
‘‘cap’’ or the failure to count the carbon sequestered in
harvested wood products (HWP). The cap represents perhaps
the greatest restriction-based disincentive to forest-based
carbon sequestration, only allowing a part of the net removal/
emission from forest management to be counted. The cap is a
country-specific constant individually calculated and negoti-
ated for each party4 which limits credits/debits from forest
management (FM, decision 16/CMP.1, UNFCCC, 2005). Since
countries cannot be debited for fellings over the limit set by the
cap, depending on how these resources are priced in the
market, powerful incentives are currently in place to harvest
biomass for bioenergy and/or HWP. Incentives for promoting
standing forests however are undermined.
The aim of the cap is threefold: to set a limit on the
potential advantage timber-rich countries might draw from
forest-based carbon sequestration (in part in order not to
undermine KP commitments), to ensure that only direct
human-induced carbon sinks are credited (i.e. Art. 3.3 af-re-
forestation efforts) and to reduce the risk that large uncer-
tainties affect accounting (in particular disturbances due to
extreme events such as forest fires, wind storms or invasive
species).5 This last point involves two further issues. The firstweather events. With the occurrence of more frequent severe
weather events, both these concerns and the number of countries
sharing them have increased in recent years.
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 1 4 ( 2 0 1 1 ) 1 0 6 2 – 1 0 7 8 1065concerns the definition of a common strategy for identifying
naturally caused disturbances such that countries are not
inadvertently penalized for this type of ‘‘emission’’. The
second concerns the extent to which countries should be held
accountable for disturbances since forest management tech-
niques can influence their occurrence.
While strategies such as the cap have been introduced in
part to diminish such incentives, they ultimately reduce the
incentive and thus the likelihood that players will take
advantage of forest-based carbon offsets, at least where
‘‘forest management’’ has been chosen as an over-arching
national framework. This ultimately limits vast potential for
forest-based carbon sequestration and thus also for combat-
ing deforestation. Again, such barriers are clearly not in the
spirit of the Kyoto enterprise.
The current ‘‘narrow’’ definition of human-induced change
represents a further restriction upon the forest-based credit-
ing of carbon sequestration to Article 3.3 (af-re-forestation)
activities where former managed and unmanaged land is
converted to forest land by active regeneration (planting). A
‘‘broad’’ definition could encompass other carbon sequester-
ing activities, thus promoting a more efficient and extensive
use of existing forest-based resources. The current, narrow
definition of human-induced activities significantly limits
incentives for improvement in potentially large carbon pools.
Further, the ability to voluntarily ‘‘elect’’ forest management
(FM) increases the risk of ‘‘cherry-picking’’ activities that favor
individual parties and potentially promotes within-country
leakage across Art’s. 3.3 and 3.4 (FM). Making Art. 3.4 reporting
mandatory and further collapsing the division between Art.
3.3 and 3.4 would go a long way toward improving the
potential for the efficient use of forest-based resources.
Although the opposite was essentially intended (Fry, 2002),6
the split between Art. 3.3 and 3.4 activities had the impact of
artificially hiving off the vast majority of human-induced
change in forest cover and growth (Art. 3.4) from the category
of af-re- and de-forestation (Art. 3.3). Moreover, the option to
voluntarily elect and thus report ‘‘forest management’’
activities represents an almost unavoidable incentive to
promote within country leakage across Art.’s 3.3 and 3.4
and may encourage forest degradation in Annex I countries
and deforestation in Non-Annex I countries where sustainable
forest management (SFM) practices are not well entrenched or
enforced.7
Restricting accounting to ‘‘human-induced’’ forest growth
and simultaneously limiting the potential of some countries to
exploit their forest resources has ultimately had the effect of
limiting the potential impact of forestry and forest-based6 Originally, Art. 3.3 was introduced so that LULUCF accounting
would focus entirely on human-induced sources of climate change
and natural forest growth would be excluded. Art. 3.4 was created
as an afterthought, primarily at the insistence of Japan. However,
this afterthought (unintentionally or not) separated forest man-
aged lands from ‘‘other’’ lands set-aside for afforestation (carbon
sequestration).
7 The problem of ‘‘leakage’’, i.e. where deforestation-related
carbon emissions are ‘‘transferred’’ to locations not subject to
LULUCF reporting while ‘‘afforestation’’ is accounted represents
an important dilemma (see Schlamadinger et al., 2007a: 278;
Plantinga and Richards, 2008).industries—which are of course explicitly ‘‘human (anthropo-
genic) practices’’—on carbon sequestration (as well as emis-
sions). The potential for disturbances and concerns that
timber-rich countries could exploit forest resources in order to
minimize their carbon reduction efforts by trading LULUCF
against their commitments, represent further significant
obstacles to the broader use of LULUCF in UNFCCC, KP and
ultimately EU-level reporting and accounting practices.
The exclusion of HWP from UNFCCC and Kyoto accounting
procedures represents a further significant and neglected
carbon pool, reducing incentives for carbon sequestration
and fossil fuel substitution. The current accounting rule used
under the KP assumes that trees (and thus HWP) are oxidized
at the time of harvest. Though this rule has the advantage of
being simple, one disadvantage is the lack of an accounting-
based incentive for storing carbon in HWP. Another disad-
vantage is that atmospheric removals and emissions by forest
products are accounted incorrectly over time. Other potential
disincentives include the likelihood that other forest resource
uses become more competitive than HWP, in particular as
bioenergy resources are progressively favored over fossil
fuels.
Accounting for HWP would mean emissions resulting from
harvesting forests are not directly accounted or are ‘delayed’
in various ways depending on the use (and lifetime) of wood.
Four different approaches for HWP accounting (see Appendix)
have been defined by the IPCC (IPCC, 2006). Harmonization is
necessary in order to avoid double-counting, to align reporting
practices across countries and in order to eliminate potential
incentives for countries to ‘‘cherry pick’’. A particular problem
in this regard arises with harmonizing the consumption and
the production approaches (i.e. should producing or consum-
ing countries have the right to credit HWP carbon sequestra-
tion?). Debiting the consumption of HWP could increase the
risk of deforestation in developing countries. A further
problem arises with how to handle both non-signatory
countries and signatory countries without emission targets.
2.1. Other accounting irregularities
Further accounting inconsistencies likewise create perverse
incentives. One is the ‘‘gross-net emissions loophole’’ created
by the fact that FM, af-re-forestation (AR) and deforestation (D)
are gross-net accounted. Only net emissions/removals occur-
ring during the first commitment period (CP-1, 2008–2012) are
accounted. All other GHG emissions are net–net accounted.
While net–net accounting explicitly compares performance to
a base year, gross-net accounting ignores any direct change
between the base year and the beginning of the commitment
period (1990–2007) and instead emphasizes year-to-year or
commitment period to commitment period change.
The opportunity created by this loophole provides strong
incentives for countries with advanced age-class forests to
harvest all biomass and replant, thus reaping the benefits of
both the harvested biomass as well as any new forest growth.
This incentive was reinforced by the so-called ‘‘compensa-
tion’’ and ‘‘fast forest fix’’ rules. The compensation rule,
intended to compensate Parties with slow growing forests for
potentially large net af-re- and deforestation-related (ARD)
emissions, permits Parties that elect FM to limit total
8 Previous estimates were considerably higher, reaching as
much as 20% of global GHG emissions. Van der Werf et al.
(2009) have also included new emission sources in their calcula-
tions (in particular peatlands).
9 Luyssaert et al. (2008) establish that old growth forests contin-
ue to sequester additional carbon though at a somewhat declining
rate after approximately 80 years of growth.
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9 M ton C annually (paragraph 10, decision 16/CMP1, UNFCCC,
2005). This provides additional incentives to pursue defores-
tation. The fast forest fix rule (paragraph 4, annex to decision
16/CMP1, UNFCCC, 2005) allows Parties that harvest a unit of
land subject to re-af-forestation between 1 January 1990 and
31 December 2007 to limit debits to the total amount of
accounted credits from the same unit of land calculated from
January 1st, 2008. This rule is important for those Parties with
fast growing forests who have not elected FM but should not be
a major problem if af-re-forestation is sustainable and
continuous.
The future of these rules is uncertain. Though some form of
gross-net or net–net accounting is likely to remain the rule, the
gross-net emissions loophole should disappear due to the lack
of a chronological gap between the signing of an agreement
and the beginning of the second commitment period (CP-2,
potentially 2013–2020 or later). CP-2 should ideally follow
immediately on the end of the first commitment period (CP-1,
2008–2012). Though gaps are inadvisable given the urgency of
the climate change mitigation agenda, given negotiation
deadlocks in Copenhagen (2009) and Cancun (2010), they have
been entertained. If gaps should arise, this may complicate
negotiations over gross-net and net–net. Second, any differ-
ences in the advantages arising from either gross-net or net–
net accounting in LULUCF should wash out over time, thus
diminishing the potential for Parties to have fundamental
disagreements on the choice of model. The adoption of an all-
inclusive land-based LULUCF accounting framework would
eliminate the potential role of any remaining loopholes,
accounting discrepancies and the potential for ‘‘cherry-
picking’’.
Finally, additional confusion arises from the fact that
different accounting procedures persist across ARD, FM (gross-
net) and cropland management, grazing land management
and revegetation (net–net). The presence of different activity-
based accounting procedures makes little sense and weakens
attempts to increase the potential role and importance of the
LULUCF sector.
3. Defining the troika: improving and
diversifying the use of forest-based resources
Powerful economic and political interests lie behind each of
the major segments of the forestry industry. Achieving an
agreement that can successfully balance potentially compet-
ing interests requires careful consideration of what we call the
‘‘troika’’ of interests and resources in the forestry sector.
Standing forests, HWP and bioenergy are each crucial not only
to the cost-effectiveness of climate mitigation strategies and
to the balanced and efficient use of forest resources, but also to
the long-term stability of the carbon accounting and negotiat-
ing framework.
3.1. Standing forests
From a climate perspective, the LULUCF sector is unique.
While all other sectors create emissions, the appropriate
management of LULUCF can instead lead to removals or‘‘carbon sequestration’’ (Petersson et al., 2009). Available land
can be re-af-forested, carbon stocks can be increased on
existing forested and other lands and deforestation can be
avoided. In essence, standing forests represent the first line of
defense against climate change. Moreover, powerful interests
lobby for their protection.
Estimates of the mitigation potential of standing forests
vary considerably. 2007 IPCC estimates, for example, lie
between 1.3 and 13.8 GtCO2e/yr (Nabuurs et al., 2007: 542).
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Though the impact of deforestation on global emissions may
have been over-estimated, total emissions from deforestation,
forest degradation and peat land emissions represent at least
15% of global anthropogenic emissions (Van der Werf et al.,
2009: 738). Moreover, for a large number of developing
countries, deforestation and forest degradation represent
the principal source of emissions (ibid.). Finally, between
2000 and 2005 global forest cover declined by approximately
1 million km2, an area representing approximately 3.1% of
global forest cover in 2000. Though rapid deforestation is
typically associated with the developing world, the first four
countries with the highest share of forest cover loss were
Brazil, Canada, Russia and the US respectively (Hansen et al.,
2010). Accounting procedures that potentially contribute to
slowing deforestation and forest cover loss thus represent
significant global public goods and can potentially be influen-
tial in both less developed, developing and developed
countries.
3.2. HWP and bioenergy
In addition to the advantages of carbon sequestration in
standing forests, there are other neglected uses of forest-
based resources. Since mature trees accumulate smaller
amounts of carbon (due to lower growth rates and higher
respiration levels),9 from a climate perspective storing
carbon by harvesting mature biomass and promoting
regeneration (through re-planting and the introduction of
a sustainable forest management requirement) may be
preferable. Harvested biomass can be turned into carbon-
storing products (HWP). Storing harvested biomass in ‘‘long-
lived’’ materials (e.g. buildings) is preferable to materials
with a high turnover rate (e.g. paper). Carbon stored in this
way is removed from the atmosphere for the duration of a
product’s lifespan.
Provided such products are long-lived and/or substitute for
more carbon intensive materials (e.g. steel, concrete), they
represent important forms of both carbon sequestration and
fossil fuel substitution. Though long-lived products eventually
decompose, waste material can be recycled as fuel for heat
and power generation. Thus, in addition to carbon sequestra-
tion in standing forests and the combined value of carbon
sequestration and fossil fuel substitution in/with HWP, the
Fig. 2 – Potential carbon sequestration using forest-based
soil, biomass and HWP.
Source: we thank Gert-Jan Nabuurs for basic data and
graphics. For an overview of the CO2FIX (v2) simulation
and similar output, see Masera et al. (2003) and Schelhaas
et al. (2004).
Fig. 3 – Relative prices of fuel chips, pulpwood and timber
in Sweden (1995–2009).
Source: Swedish Forestry Agency. Note: In 1995 the
average price of pulpwood was 293 SEK/m3, for timber 422
SEK/m3 and for fuel chips 109 SEK/MWh.
11 The Swedish Forestry Association reports that demand for
energy wood is affecting harvesting practices. See ‘‘Forest Owners
Make Profits on Energy Wood’’ (Nordic Forest Owners’ Association,
July 28th, 2009). Industry experts note there is even competition
over what share of harvested treetops should be used for bioe-
nergy vs. what share should be used for sawn timber. Finally,
according to a FERN report, Finland’s decision to promote bioe-
nergy triggered objections from forest-based industries about the
impact rising demand for biomass material might have on prices
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a third valuable use of forest resources.
From a pure climate perspective, biomass from the LULUCF
sector can act as a cumulative carbon pool, both sequestering
carbon and substituting for more carbon-intensive materials
and fuels. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the strategic management of
carbon sequestration in forest biomass and biomass-based
end-products can potentially represent a significant and
increasingly important share of overall carbon sequestra-
tion.10
More importantly for our purposes, without adequate
accounting practices, much of the forest-related industry
could begin to disintegrate. In timber-rich countries such as
Sweden and Finland, this can ultimately affect a very large
share of economic activity. In 1999, for example, the sum of all
forest-related industry together (including research and
development) amounted to almost 1/3rd of total economic
activity in Sweden (Skogsindustrierna, 1999).
While HWP currently remains economically attractive, in
the longer term this may depend on a number of key factors.
For one, prices of carbon intensive construction materials
(concrete and steel) will rise with the increasing price of
carbon emissions. In the shorter term, this will advantage
wood-based construction materials over more carbon inten-
sive materials. However, in the longer term, without a
mechanism accounting for carbon sequestered in HWP,
bioenergy will likely become more economically attractive.
In some instances, this is in fact already the case, as prices
for bioenergy biomass have already begun to approximate
those for HWP biomass. As illustrated in Fig. 3, pulpwood and
timber are the biggest losers. Timber consumers—sawmills,
the construction industry and or the pulp and paper industries
(also furniture, wood products, the biomass and bioenergy
industries)—will presumably be harder hit by the changing10 See also Sathre and O’Connor (2008) and Pingoud et al. (2003).price structure as carbon prices continue to raise fossil fuel-
based energy prices, leading to increasing competition over
available wood resources.11 Bioenergy will continue to become
rapidly more competitive. The 2010 EUWood report likewise
notes that demand for biomass material for energy use is likely
to outstrip available supply sometime between 2015 and 2020
(Mantau et al., 2010: 23), creating the conditions for significant
conflict across the different constituents of the forestry value
chain. Improved forest management could however amelio-
rate at least some of these constraints (Verkerk et al., 2011).
Though powerful incentives for fossil fuel substitution may
have important emission reducing effects, they may also have
far-reaching and unintended consequences for standing
forests (see in particular Wise et al., 2009), as well as for
more conventional forest-based industries. Few would argue
that a more diversified use of forest-based resources based on
the promotion of standing forests and HWP is less efficient.
Following Nabuurs et al. (2008), quite a diverse range of
potential forest uses can be mobilized in order to ‘‘maintain or
maximize forest carbon pools and carbon sequestration’’.
Without entering into the details of this debate, carbon
accounting strategies that provide a framework for supporting
multiple forest uses represent a meaningful alternative. Thus,
in order to encourage a more efficient and balanced use ofand increasing competition with other forest products (FERN,
2008a: 13; FERN, 2008b: 7).
12 See the summary of Party submissions (11/2009): http://
unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/summarytable.
pdf.
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accounting framework is presumably a requirement.
4. At the bargaining table: current options for
future reporting
Thus the two principal goals to be achieved in order to
promote a more balanced and efficient use of forest resources
are the full inclusion of LULUCF accounting (in particular the
merging of Art. 3.3 af-re-deforestation (ARD) and 3.4 forest
management (FM) activities into one all-encompassing and
all-inclusive carbon-accounting framework) and the inclusion
of HWP in UNFCCC and Kyoto accounting procedures.
Although the rules for LULUCF-sector accounting under a
revised Kyoto Protocol are currently under consideration,
none of the options currently on the negotiating table propose
merging Art’s 3.3 and 3.4.
Options for future reporting and accounting in the LULUCF-
sector have been discussed since 2008 under the so called Ad
Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments (AWG-KP) for
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 2009a).
Among the options currently under negotiation, the most
important involve discussions of (1) gross-net vs. net–net (vis-
a`-vis some kind of reference level) accounting, (2) how to deal
with the problem of ‘‘disturbances’’ and (3) HWP. A number of
additional issues—such as the inclusion of new activities or
carbon pools (in particular rewetting and drainage) and
production vs. equivalent forest—are likewise under discus-
sion.
According to the latest information posted on the UNFCCC
website concerning AWG-KP negotiations (June 2010), it
remains unclear whether new carbon pools and activities
will be included and which accounting approach will be used
for forest management. In the latest revised proposal by the
Chair (FCCC/AWG/CRP.41) used at the 16th AWG-KP meeting, a
preference was expressed for moving in the direction of
‘‘complete coverage of managed lands’’. In the same draft, a
request was proposed to the Subsidiary Body for scientific and
Technological Advice (SBSTA) to further study this matter,
essentially indicating that land-based accounting and the
possible introduction of mandatory reporting have been
postponed.
In what follows, we discuss and analyze the predicted
outcomes associated with adopting various proposals on the
negotiating table. Since strategies for incorporating all major
carbon pools in a unified LULUCF framework merging Art.’s 3.3
and 3.4 are not currently on the negotiating table, they are not
addressed in this section. We return however to these issues in
our broader discussion below.
4.1. Net–net vs. gross-net and reference level accounting
under FM and handling uncertainty
Three main concepts (and some variants) have for a long time
been the target of negotiation: activity-based net–net and
gross-net accounting. As a compromise between net–net and
gross-net accounting the concept of a reference level (also
called the bar) was introduced in 2009 (UNFCCC, 2009b). The
idea was to define a level acceptable both for the group ofcountries preferring either pure net–net or gross-net account-
ing. Suggestions on how to set the reference level cover a wide
range of alternatives, from the 1990-level based on historical
mean values to projection-based strategies.12 Although the
accounting options have now been grouped into four
approaches called ‘‘reference levels’’, ‘‘baselines’’, ‘‘net–net
relative the first CP’’ and ‘‘cap’’ (according to the current
negotiation draft) the main differences between options
presented here remain.
While net–net (using either 1990 as a base year or a flexible
reference level) or gross-net accounting themselves yield very
different credit/debit outcomes, alternative methods for
accounting in forest management have also been discussed.
The first two (the cap and a discount factor) have mainly been
discussed in combination with gross-net accounting and the
third (the band) in combination with a flexible reference level.
The objective with a discount factor is the same as with the
cap, but a discount factor is set as a percentage of the actual
removal/emission and is not absolute (as in the case of a cap).
Thus if a discount factor is used instead of a cap, it is more
difficult to predict the actual contribution of the LULUCF-
sector to overall commitments. In contrast to the cap, a
discount factor set proportionally to actual removals may raise
incentives to pursue removals and limit large emissions.
However, we suggest below that even this model fails to
adequately consider all potential incentives for carbon
sequestration.
A third way to restrict accounting, mainly when using the
flexible reference level concept, was introduced during 2009
(UNFCCC, 2009c) and called the ‘‘band’’. The idea is to only
credit or debit emissions/removals outside the band that can
be set symmetrically around the reference level as a percent-
age of the reference level or asymmetrically from the
reference level to a predefined level (i.e. zero).
One principal justification behind restrictions such as the
cap, discount factor and the reference band is the potential
effect of disturbances. Though in principle restrictions are
not desirable—in particular due to their impact on incentives
for carbon sequestration—other ways of handling this
problem are also under discussion. Force majeure is a
mechanism meant to handle extraordinary events or cir-
cumstances whose occurrence or severity is beyond the
control of and not materially influenced by an individual
Party (UNFCCC, 2009a). Though the details are still under
consideration, some kind of threshold for the magnitude of
the event related to the total emission of the Party could be
applied. Emissions from land where such events have
occurred during a commitment period could either be
excluded from accounting until subsequent removals have
balanced out the loss at the time of the event, or could be
carried over to the subsequent commitment period. Such
procedures would only be acceptable under the provision that
no land-use change has occurred on those lands and thus that
the harvesting of salvage wood be considered incompatible
with their use.
Fig. 4 – Total predicted removals from forest management (in M ton CO2 and Relative to 1990 Emissions).
Fig. 5 – Predicted outcomes by FM accounting approach relative to 1990 emissions (excl. LULUCF).
Source: Annex-I country submissions to AWG-KP 13 (August 2010). Totals represent data for all Annex I countries with a cap
inscribed in decision 16/CMP.1 (UNFCCC, 2005) and that have also submitted a reference level to the AWG-KP.
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accounting mechanisms on FM removals13
In the context of different accounting approaches, large
variations in net removals from FM have major implications.
To what extent the projections used to calculate CP-2
predictions are based on similar country-level assumptions
(e.g. regarding harvest rates and projected demand) remains
unclear. Though some EU member states employ the same
underlying assumptions when projecting the demand for
bioenergy (EU-submission, August), a review of individual13 Forest management data for 1990, 2008–2012 and 2013–2020
and the proposed reference level for individual countries are pro-
vided in Table A-I (Appendix).Party submissions under AWG-KP during 2009–2010 illustrates
that ‘‘small changes’’ in the assumptions and models used for
projections may result in large changes in net removals. This is
important to bear in mind when assessing the different
accounting options.
Fig. 4 shows the total predicted unrestricted removals (total
forest growth, minus harvesting) from FM for three periods in
time (1990, 2008–2012 and 2013–2020). The comparison
comprises all Parties with a cap inscribed in decision 16/
CMP.1 (UNFCCC, 2005) and with submitted reference levels
under the AWG-KP. The total impact of unrestricted removals
was estimated at approximately 800, 1000 and 900 M ton CO2
for 1990, 2008–2012 and 2013–2020, respectively. Unrestricted
removals from FM thus represent approximately 7–9% of 1990
emissions relative to other sectors. Fig. 5 also illustrates the
significant restriction of the cap limit on potential accountable
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 1 4 ( 2 0 1 1 ) 1 0 6 2 – 1 0 7 81070credits. For the countries considered, the cap represents only
25% of total potential carbon sequestration.
Different accounting approaches lead to significantly
different outcomes (Fig. 5). Moreover, the results are highly
sensitive to changes in the parameters (e.g. reference levels)
chosen by individual countries. Thus the predicted results for
some individual countries can strongly influence the total
outcome. Uncertainty in various forms thus significantly
affects these results.
Assuming the business-as-usual (BAU) prediction is cor-
rect, all options result in more credits than the current
system. However, all currently proposed models impose
restrictions on actual removals. Switching from unrestricted
gross-net to net–net accounting or vice versa does not
influence incentives for improvements but does have a
large influence on national commitments. A country specific
projected baseline is a way of focusing on incentives rather than
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Russia Accounting approach
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Reference level set to 2008–2012 
1990 removals (net-net) 2013–2020 
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Total unrestricted removals based on subm. to AWG-KP 1990 
2008–2012 
2013–2020 
Current system (gross-net) 2013–2020 
Reference level set to 1990 removals (net-net) 2008–2012 
2013–2020 
Party proposal ref. level (reference level approach) 1990 
2008–2012 
2013–2020 
Party proposal ref. level (reference level approach) 2013–2020 (+40
2013–2020 (40
Source: based on historical and projected data submitted to AWG-KP.may end up in crediting/debiting incorrect trends. All models
that impose restrictions decrease incentives, but in different
ways. The cap creates fair incentives up to the cap but not
above, while discount factors create partly restricted
incentives along a range. Underlying assumptions for predic-
tions/projections are country specific.
For individual countries, different accounting models
likewise lead to very different results depending on the size
of the net removals and the trend from 1990 onwards.
Moreover, Parties do not always use the same reference level
approach. To understand country positions regarding ac-
counting approaches, projections for three example coun-
tries—Sweden, Russia and the UK are provided (Table 1). These
results are broadly representative of the range of possible
outcomes across countries and illustrate potential country-
level sensitivity to changes in the accounting options.
For Sweden, where FM represents a large share of total
emissions, a shift from the current system to one of thetions, relative to 1990 emissions (select countries by
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could significantly change the contribution from FM. Changing
to a net–net system with 1990 as the baseline, for example,
means that FM would become a source (+20.6% relative to 1990
emissions) instead of a sink (3% of 1990 emissions due to the
cap) using the current system for CP-1. Flexible reference
levels would mean zero credits based on the BAU prediction
(like most countries, Sweden proposes to use a BAU-projection
for 2013–2020 as the reference level). However, a relatively
small increase or decrease in fellings during the commitment
period could significantly alter these results.
Two sensitivity analyses were conducted by increasing or
decreasing annual net removals 40%. Depending on the
deviation from the BAU-prediction, the potential importance
of a restriction mechanism increases (see the last rows in each
country table). For example, the predicted outcome in Sweden
changes from a significant debit to a credit compared to BAU.
Sensitivity beyond the control of individual Parties is often
used as an argument for restricting accounting using a cap, a
discount factor or a band. Similar results emerge for Canada
and Russia. However, for countries where the relative size of
FM is small, sensitivity to change in net removals is less
important. Other potential deviations may arise due to
uncertainties in the projection, natural disturbances or
unexpected (not climate-induced) changes in the forest sector.
For our purposes, both currently proposed restrictions and
the cap represent significant disincentives to the effective andFig. 6 – Left: Net annual increment in forests available for wood
Accounted/potential removals for forest management (first com
Source: UN (2000) and Annex-I country submissions to AWG-K. 
that total removals are equal to the level of the cap. However, e
raise their FM contribution to carbon sequestration by increasin
growth. Further, carbon removals from afforestation (Art. 3.3 Aefficient promotion of carbon sequestration. While we
sympathize with concerns regarding disturbances, we like-
wise point to the negative impact restrictions have on
incentives for carbon sequestration. As illustrated in Fig. 6,
many countries have very large potentials for carbon
sequestration that are not encouraged under the current
accounting mechanism. Thus countries currently account
only for a very small share of the potential carbon sequestra-
tion that occurs under FM (Fig. 7, right panel).
We highlight this disincentive for carbon sequestration by
referring to what we call the ‘‘incentive gap’’; essentially that
amount of potential carbon sequestration not incentivized in
the current carbon accounting framework. Though there are
several possible ways of measuring the incentive gap, we
describe only two possibilities in what follows. In Fig. 6 (right
panel) we measure the incentive gap as the total amount of
new forest growth (after harvesting) under forest manage-
ment not accounted for under the current cap system. As
suggested in this graphic, the amount is quite large. Total
potential non-incentivized carbon removals/sequestration
represents an additional 75% of total carbon sequestration.
Thus the cap significantly limits the potential incentivizing of
forest-based resources for the purposes of carbon sequestra-
tion by failing to encourage this type of strategic behavior.
One additional way of thinking about the incentive gap is to
consider the total amount of annual forest growth (before
harvesting). With appropriate incentives in place for carbon supply/Net emissions (excl. LULUCF) in mid-1990s. Right:
mitment period, excluding Art. 3.3 ARD).
Note: in the right panel, values of 100% result from the fact
ven these countries may still have significant potential to
g forest cover and/or raising the total amount of forest
RD) are not included or depicted here.
Fig. 7 – Total forest area, growth and emissions.
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share of the annual forest increment (growth) be used for
carbon sequestration (and not harvested). Thus total annual
forest increment represents one additional conceptualization
of the incentive gap.
Fig. 6 (left panel) illustrates total annual forest growth
relative to net carbon emissions in other sectors (excluding
LULUCF). For many or most countries, total annual forest
growth represents a relatively small share of emissions. On
the other hand, several countries exhibit carbon sequestration
potential that well exceeds net emissions (in particular
Sweden, Finland and Latvia). However, it is difficult to
determine how countries would behave if firm incentives
were in place to encourage and account for carbon sequestra-
tion in standing forests. Our emphasis throughout has been to
encourage the efficient and balanced use of forest resources.
Assuming adequate incentives for bioenergy, standing forests
and HWP, it is unlikely that timber-rich countries would
decide to leave all new forest standing and cease harvesting.
Concerns that countries with extensive forest cover would
disproportionately benefit from including the LULUCF sector
should be considered in more detail.14 Even in countries where
currently accounted removals represent 100% of potential FM
removals, there is still likely to be significant potential for
increasing the overall contribution from FM by raising the
share of forest cover and/or by increasing forest growth. Thus,
for example, in Fig. 7 (right panel) countries like Denmark,
Switzerland and Portugal presumably have significant
remaining forest growth potential. Japan, on the other hand,
has already set its cap high enough to cover all current forest
growth, thereby incentivizing carbon sequestration in stand-
ing forests.
On the other hand, as suggested in Fig. 7 (panel a), there is a
powerful and highly significant relationship between the total14 One recent example of this concern is represented by a contri-
bution from Ecofys and Climate Analytics: ‘‘Climate Action Track-
er: Developed Countries Set to Widen the Emissions Gap’’,
(December 8th, 2010).forest area and the amount of available carbon sequestration
potential (or total growth/fellings). It is above all this
relationship that generates concern that some countries
might use their generous forest endowments to reduce
commitments. As illustrated in Fig. 8 (panel b), however,
there is virtually no measurable relationship between total
forest area and the potential for net forest increment (annual
forest growth) to cover net GHG emissions (excluding LULUCF).
This point suggests in particular that the relative size of the
forested area in individual countries matters far less in terms
of the total potential carbon sequestration impact of forests on
minimizing commitments than do other factors. Thus, for
example, forest management traditions in countries like
Sweden, Finland, Latvia and New Zealand matter far more
than the total forested area. The US, for example, would only
be able to cover about 14% of its total emissions through forest
growth, while Russia and Canada would be able to cover
approximately 46 and 48% respectively.
6. HWP
The predicted impact of the proposed HWP accounting rules
varies dramatically from country to country and rule to rule
(Fig. 8). Of the approaches suggested (the stock change
approach SCA, the atmospheric flow approach AFA, the stock
change approach domestic use SCAD and the production
approach PA) the biggest potential change in carbon account-
ing practices would result from the atmospheric flow
approach (AFA), which attempts to consider trade-related
HWP flows in national-level accounting. This model in
particular has a significant impact on the carbon balance of
individual countries. For instance, in 2007, HWP removals in
Sweden (under AFA) represent about 41% of net emissions
(excluding LULUCF). Under the production approach (PA),
removals represent only 7.5% of net emissions (SLU, 2009).
Thus selecting which model should be used is a delicate task.
Arriving at a viable inclusion of HWP accounting proce-
dures is no simple matter. As illustrated in particular by the
Fig. 8 – HWP contribution to climate mitigation by method and country (or group of countries).
Source: based on HWP-modeling by Kim Pingoud.
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very significant differences could potentially emerge depend-
ing on whether the producers or consumers of wood products
bear the consequence of their future decay and/or gain the
benefit of including the sequestered carbon in their national
inventories.
At least one powerful argument in favor of PA over AFA has
to do with the many disadvantages that arise from the timber
trade. For one, most wood exports are relatively carbon-
intensive due to the role of long-range transport (see e.g.
Magelli et al., 2009). Moreover, the AFA approach may
ultimately provide quite powerful encouragement to the
illegal timber trade. In many ways the PA approach appears
to represent a more balanced strategy and is the main
alternative in the current negotiating text.
7. Discussion
Proposed changes to the current accounting rules would not
significantly change total FM credits. If the ‘‘cap’’ is retained,
incentives for promoting carbon sequestration in standingforests will not be enhanced. If the cap is replaced with a
discount factor or a band (combined with a flexible reference
level), uncertainty over the total credits or debits from forest
management will increase. Though this uncertainty might
enhance incentives to manage the forest to keep the net
uptake above the reference level, the removal of all restric-
tions on accounting the carbon sequestered in standing
forests would create potentially far more significant incen-
tives. In this sense, developing alternatives such as force
majeure for handling disturbances may be preferable to any of
the other models currently under discussion. Though an
alternative might be to remove areas with potentially large
impacts from natural disturbances from accounting require-
ments, the incentive to manage natural disturbances would
thereby decrease and incentives to promote increased forest
growth diminished. Similar problems arise with discussions
over whether FM should be voluntary or mandatory.
In order to use the world’s forests more efficiently,
accounting strategies must be found to (1) promote seques-
tration in standing forests and (2) encourage an efficient and
balanced use of forest products (including both HWP and
bioenergy). The original and artificial decision to separate
15 Based on online Eurostat data for ‘‘wood and wood waste’’ use
in gross inland consumption.
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ultimately have, a negative impact on both strategic goals. The
reasons for this are straightforward. Confining afforestation to
ARD lands has the result of unnecessarily restricting incen-
tives and efforts to promote standing forests, while the ability
to voluntarily designate forest lands as ‘‘managed forests’’
subject to a ‘‘cap’’ discourages both their sustainable use and
large scale investments to promote increased forest growth.
Though the technical challenges confronting both an
adequate accounting of forest resources and the inclusion
of currently omitted carbon pools are significant, the techni-
ques used are constantly improving and today’s monitoring
systems are already far more advanced than those of only a
decade ago. Moreover, incorporating and accounting for more
carbon resources will only propel these developments
forward. Thus, although technical challenges represent
important obstacles that need to be taken into account, the
advantages that can be achieved argue in favor of forward
rather than backward motion.
Two principal arguments support movement in the
direction of an all-inclusive national inventory model for
LULUCF accounting that collapses the division between ARD
and FM, includes additional activities and incorporates HWP
accounting principles. The first is the incentive to promote
standing forests. This incentive is important not only in order
to encourage more countries in the developing world to
become formal members of the KP strategy by allowing them
to sell carbon credits from forestry in return for formal
emission commitments, sustainable forest management
(SFM) principles as well as the development of verifiable
national forest inventories, but also in order to slow and
eventually put a stop to deforestation and declining forest
cover both in the developed and developing world. In
particular for the more forested countries, the ability to sell
carbon credits from standing forests in the Kyoto framework
should provide powerful incentives for more countries to
become formal, contributing members and should add
significantly re-invigorated incentives to current REDD+ and
forest-related CDM efforts.
The second is the incentive to use HWP and continue
increasing the size of the HWP carbon pool. The alternative to
promoting the increasing use of HWP and a cumulatively
increasing HWP carbon pool is the further promotion of
bioenergy use—in particular at the expense of HWP. The
consequence of failing to provide competing incentives in the
Kyoto accounting framework either for standing forests or
HWP—in particular under the current regimen where man-
aged forests are only voluntarily accounted for (i.e. not at all in
many cases)—is the potential devastation of many of the
earth’s remaining forests and a shift from extensive use of
harvested wood products (HWP) to extensive bioenergy use.
As illustrated in Fig. 3 above, the likely consequence of
failing to include HWP accounting mechanisms in the Kyoto
framework is the gradual elimination of traditional forest-
based industries in favor of bioenergy. Moreover, in the EU
context, under the current EU Emission Trading Scheme and
the newly revised Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC), bio-
mass-based heat and power production is strongly favored
over wood-based end products. The European Commission’s
Renewable Energy Roadmap, for example, envisions a largeand significant role for biomass material in heating and power
production (European Commission, 2005, 2007). And bioenergy
use has roared ahead at an impressive pace, having grown by
as much as 174% in the New Member states, 68% across the
EU15 and 88% across the EU as whole between 1990 and 2009.15
Depletion of the world’s forests and the decline of forest-
based industries is surely not the desired goal of the Kyoto
framework. Yet the potential (if unintended) consequence of
failure to resolve these inadequacies is likely to have far-
reaching impacts on the global use of forest-based resources.
These points ultimately require KP contracting Parties to find a
way to both incorporate HWP accounting into the formal
accounting mechanism and to approve a strategy for collaps-
ing ARD and FM (as well as the remaining categories) into one
national LULUCF inventory model.
The division between ARD and FM ultimately neglects the
greatest human-induced impact on forest cover: the role and
importance of forestry and forest-based industries. In order to
correct this error, these activities should be re-united under a
single mantle and sustainable forest management (SFM)
principles as well as the development of verifiable national
forest inventories pursued instead. Though this might seem
an impossible task, the principles of SFM are ultimately
reinforced through an emphasis on accounting procedures
and the requirement of verifiable national forest inventories.
Since any deforestation is counted as an ‘‘emission’’, countries
(and governments) hoping to benefit from LULUCF under the
Kyoto system are ultimately encouraged to promote and
enforce SFM. Further, involving governments in the Kyoto
mechanism by allowing them the right to buy and sell forest-
based carbon credits ultimately places governments on the
side of protecting forests and against illegal logging. Failing
this, any within country ‘‘leakage’’—for example between
afforestation and forestry—automatically cancels out poten-
tial benefits arising from the right to sell carbon credits in the
international accounting framework.
Many NGO’s and even some developing countries have
objected to the inclusion of forests and forestry in national
accounting procedures. Though there are many reasons for
these objections—fears of a collapse in carbon prices, fears
that industry and the power sector would experience reduced
pressures to reduce emissions and/or fears that timber-rich
countries might leverage advantages in forest cover and
growth potential against their emission reduction commit-
ments—these fears are not well founded. If we agree that the
principal goal of Kyoto or its replacement is emission
reductions, then we should immediately agree that slowing
deforestation represents one of the greatest potentials of a
successor to the Kyoto framework. Achieving this goal alone
could significantly help reduce emissions. Reversing defores-
tation would surpass this goal.
NGO and developing world fears are unfounded for the
following reasons. First, a collapse in carbon prices ultimately
means cheaper alternatives for reducing emissions have
become available. Whether caused by the potential to account
for emissions/removals from forestry or some other factor,
cheaper alternatives mean emission reductions will occur
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fall, this represents a positive (not a negative) development
and should be encouraged (by whatever means—except of
course by ‘‘grandfathering’’ or giving away carbon credits).
Second, the ultimate goal of any carbon accounting frame-
work should be to reduce emissions where this can be done
most cost-efficiently. Forcing industry to reduce emissions
when other more cost-efficient strategies are available—such
as by reducing building-related energy use or raising the
carbon sequestration/fossil fuel substitution potential of
forests and forestry—ultimately reduces the overall effective-
ness of emission-reducing strategies.
The last major objection—that countries could leverage
forest growth potential against their Kyoto commitments—
deserves more discussion. Many countries (both developed
and developing) may well under-estimate their potential for
utilizing the Kyoto framework (assuming the inclusion of
LULUCF and HWP) to promote domestic forest growth. At least
one measure of the potential for promoting domestic forest
growth is provided by EU member states that have taken
advantage of incentives in the EU’s Common Agricultural
Policy for promoting re-af-forestation. Several have both
significantly increased their share of land devoted to forests
as well as total annual growth, in particular Spain, Ireland,
Italy and Greece (Fig. 9, panel a). While Hungary also
significantly increased forest cover and annual growth, it
became an EU member only in 2004. A number of other EU
member states have increased total annual forest growth
without increasing the share of land devoted to forests (Fig. 9,
panel b). Thus, even countries without significant land use
conversion potential may be able to take advantage of
unexplored LULUCF potential.
Such barriers need not stifle progress toward the goal of
stabilizing and reducing global emissions, nor should they
stand in the way of arresting deforestation. Though potential
carbon sequestration amounts may seem like a lot in some
countries, a few important points should not be forgotten. For
one, we should expect countries like Sweden, Finland and
others to continue using a significantly large share of their
forest-based resources for other uses (such as HWP, bioenergyFig. 9 – Change in total forest cover and land conversions.
Source: based on data published in UN (2000).and other forestry-based value chains). For another, one way
of skirting this dilemma is to set the rules of the game (how
and what is accounted for) before setting commitments
(‘‘rules before commitments’’). Though this is no longer
possible, whether it matters in the longer term is questionable.
If the rules are in place when states re-set commitments at the
following round, this makes it possible to set commitments
after setting rules. Any advantages states may obtain from
setting rules after commitments cannot easily be repeated at
the following round. For another, caps or bands do not have to
be continued. If set for one round (to diminish attempts to
exploit domestic advantages), they can be removed for later
rounds.
The greatest benefits from the sequestration potential of
forests and HWP, however, can ultimately only be attained if
the rules are set (during current negotiations over Kyoto-II) to
allow for maximum potential emission reductions and
removals in the shortest timeframe possible. The inclusion
of forest-based and HWP carbon removals in Kyoto accounting
procedures is the best and quickest way to achieve this goal.
Moreover, given deforestation pressures, significant benefits
can be obtained by a strategy requiring participant countries to
become formal members (with commitments) in the Kyoto
process and requiring the development and elaboration of
SFM and national inventory procedures, in order to be able to
take advantage of the right to sell carbon credits resulting from
forest-based carbon offsets and/or additional forest-based
carbon sequestration.
The introduction of a ‘‘conditionality principle’’ is ulti-
mately in the interest of all Parties. Such a principle, along
with the requirement of formal Kyoto commitments, could be
used to encourage more developing countries with significant
forest resources to become a part of the Kyoto process in order
to take advantage of selling carbon credits—a significant
incentive in countries frequently strapped for financial
resources. Moreover, since developing countries generally
do not face the requirement of setting emission reduction
commitments, being able to benefit financially from Kyoto
inclusion represents a win–win strategy. While such a strategy
places significant pressure on developing world governments
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potential financial gains represent a significant incentive. For
the developed world, the involvement of developing timber-
rich countries also represents a potential advantage by making
cheaper carbon credits readily available.
Though we essentially assume throughout, for the sake of
simplicity, that afforestation is equivalent to biodiversity
protection and promotion, this may not always be true. Where
the model proposed herein succeeds in promoting standing
forests, in particular over other forest resource uses, the
interests of biodiversity may be adequately protected. However,
where forestry itself is accelerated at the expense of biodiversi-
ty, this could be counter to the goals of promoting future forest
resilience and ecosystem preservation and promotion. In this
regard, it may be necessary to tweak the model in order to
provide a context for favoring biodiversity protection over other
forest resource uses. One possibility, for example, might be to
value and thus count the carbon sequestration value of natural,
untouched forests at a moderately higher level than that of
managed forests. However, by granting more weight to standing
forests and diminishing the emphasis on bioenergy, the above
model already represents a significant improvement with
respect to biodiversity promotion.
Finally, this last point suggests it is incumbent upon
international and national decision-making bodies to create
and maintain frameworks for the constant monitoring of
agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol and its eventual
successors in order to ensure that the outcomes match the
intended goals.
8. Conclusions
Current carbon accounting frameworks do not adequately
reward or even recognize the climate change mitigation and
adaptation potential of forests and forest-related industries. In
order to successfully balance competing interests, to enhance
the efficiency and effectiveness of the climate change
mitigation framework and to promote the balanced use of
forest resources, an improved carbon accounting framework
is necessary. While we recognize the political difficulties of
improving international frameworks like the Kyoto Protocol,
we think the advantages far outweigh potential costs.
Current international bargaining, however, focuses pri-
marily on strategies designed to prevent rapid deforestation,
in particular through REDD+ and avoided deforestation. We do
not wish to diminish such efforts. Further, attempts to
promote an all-encompassing, land-based, carbon-accounting
framework utilizing national LULUCF inventories and to
expand accounting practices to include all major carbon pools
point in the right direction (Cowie et al., 2007; Plantinga and
Richards, 2008; Andersson et al., 2009). However, further
incentivizing forests and forest-based resources in fully
accounting for all LULUCF activities could significantly
contribute to a framework that either lacks adequate
resources (REDD+) or is under-utilized by international
investors (the forest component of the clean development
mechanism or CDM).
The inclusion of HWP in carbon-accounting, however,
represents the other foot in the grand scheme of LULUCFaccounting practices. Without this second important piece in
the bargaining framework, resistance to LULUCF inclusion
from some quarters is likely to continue. Together, and along
with the current advantage enjoyed by bioenergy, these two
additional options should help to achieve a more balanced use
of forest resources and to achieve broader support at the
bargaining table. Without the inclusion of HWP accounting,
other uses of forest-based resources (in particular bioenergy)
will be favored.
The two greatest obstacles to an improved Kyoto-style
agreement including both LULUCF and HWP accounting are:
(1) fears that some of the developed countries will take
advantage of extensive forest resources in order to diminish
emission reduction efforts and (2) the interests of the timber-
rich countries with extensive forest-based industries which
presumably fear excessive competition over forest-based
resources and the potential decline of forest-based industries.
The timber-rich countries in the developed world in particular
are likely to resist attempts to include LULUCF in Kyoto
accounting mechanisms without parallel concessions on the
inclusion of HWP accounting procedures. Without this, the
potentially negative impact on local forest-based industries is
likely to be substantial and potentially prohibitive. On the
other hand, including HWP is likely to encourage far more
widespread support for LULUCF inclusion in the Kyoto
accounting process. Further, fears that developed countries
could take advantage of their forest resources to diminish
emission reduction efforts are not supported by the evidence.
Current discussions of the revised and updated Kyoto
framework do not include all of the options discussed above.
In particular there is currently no real discussion—at least at
the negotiating table—about the possibility of collapsing Art’s
3.3 and 3.4 into a single category or of merging all fluxes into
one larger, all-encompassing model. On the other hand, there
is currently discussion about the possibility of including HWP
in the accounting framework and there has even been some
discussion of shifting from voluntary to mandatory reporting
under Art 3.4 (forest management).
Focusing on the bargaining framework, both LULUCF and
HWP accounting are essential to ensuring a successful
outcome. Developing countries are likely to support the
inclusion of LULUCF accounting if their respective govern-
ments can attain the benefits of selling forestry-based carbon
credits in the Kyoto framework. Moreover, such a strategy may
help encourage governments to side with supporting standing
forests over the illegal timber trade, since any within-country
leakage would effectively become an economic cost. This
‘‘carrot’’ can ultimately be used as a strategy to encourage
developing countries to join the Kyoto framework by imple-
menting a conditionality principle: countries should only be
permitted to buy and sell carbon credits (including forest-
based carbon offset credits) in the UNFCCC and Kyoto
frameworks if they are formal members of the agreement
and submit annual national inventory reports. Timber-rich
countries with important forest-based industries should favor
the inclusion of HWP in the accounting framework since this
would ultimately help protect the interests of forest-based
industries and ensure bioenergy concerns do not completely
disrupt more traditional forest-resource uses and value
chains.
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